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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

NATIONAL FARMERS UNION
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
COMPANY,
Pia in tiff-Appellant
Case No. 15317

vs.
WESTERN CASUALTY AND
SURETY COMPANY,
Defendant-Res pendent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by plaintiff-appellant, National Farmers
Union Property and Casualty Company, against defendant-respondent,
Western Casualty and Surety Company, whereby plaintiff is attempting
to recover from defendant monies paid in settlement of a tQrt claim.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Motions for summary judgment filed by both parties were heard
by Judge Dean E. Conder on the 9th day of fune, 1977.

Based upon the

Written and oral arguments, the court ordered that plaintiff s motion for
51

nirnary

judgment be denied and that defendant s motion for summary judg-
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RELIEF S8UGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks to have the order granting defendant's motion
for summary judgment and denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Western agrees with the statement of facts as set forth in the
plaintiff's brief, except in the following important particulars. First of all,
it is implied in plaintiff's brief that Western or Story agreed to pay $12,500

which is net.the case at all·

Defendant denies that it has an obligation to

pay what plaintiff classifies as Brent G. Story's proportionate share. Secon;
plaintiff represents in its brief that there is no dispute as to whether coverc:'
is provfded under either of the insurance policies involved in this case. As

will be pointed out more thoroughly in Point III of this brief, defendant takes
the position that coverage under its insurance policy was excluded by
Specific Exclusion l (e).
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ANY AMOUNT FROM
DEFENDANT UNDER A THEORY OF SUBROGATION OR CONTRIBUTION BECAUSE AN INSURER MAY NOT RECOVER FROM ITS
OWN INSURED OR CO-INSURED.
In the Declaration of plaintiff's insurance policy, the named
insured, Weber County Sheriff's Mounted Posse, is identified as a
corporation, and in light of that, Brent G. Story, as captain of the Sher!fi' 5
Posse, is an insured under plaintiff's policy, which reads as follows: Sec
2, Persons Insured:
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"Each of the following is an insured under this insurance to
the extent set forth below:

"(c) If the named insured is designated in the Declarations as
other than an individual, partners hip or joint venture, the
organization so designated and any executive officer, director
or stockholder thereof while acting within the scope of his
duties as such." (emphasis added)
In light of this language there is no question therefore, that both the Posse
and Brent G. Story as an officer of the Posse were co-insureds under plaintiff's policy. Under the holding of a very recent Utah Supreme Court decision,
it is now clear that in Utah an insurer may not bring an action against one of
its co-insureds under a theory of subrogation.
In Board of Education of fordan School District v. Hales, 566 P. Zd
124 7 (Utah July 5, 19 77) , the plaintiff, Board of Education, had entered into
a contractual arrangement with the general contractor, Paulsen and

,

Christiansen (not parties to that action), for the construction of Bingham
High School.

Plaintiff then obtained a "builders risk" insurance policy

insuring the interests of the Board of Education, the general contractor
specifically named, and "subcontractors". The general contractor then entered
into a subcontract with defendants in that action.

Sometime later a fire broke

out at the construction site and under the policy the plaintiff's insurance
carriers paid claims amounting to $58,824.00, of which $720.00 was paid to
defendants.
Plaintiffs

insurance carriers, then instituted an action in subrogation

~' ' 1 '- Jc?tendanl 'Nhom they alleged was liable under a theory of negligence
1

- '

c

loss caused by the fire.

They were attempting to collect from defendants
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all of the money paid out by the insurance carriers except for the $ 720 .00 ;:
to defendants. The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of

def~:·

dants and the Supreme Court affirmed on the basis that an insurance carr!e:
not maintain a subrogation action against a co-insured.

In this decision,

court merely adopted a generally recognized legal principle and made the
following observations:
"Yet courts have consistently held that where an insurance
company attempts to recover, as a subrogee, from a coinsured generally covered under a fire insurance policy,
the action must fail in the absence of design or fraud on
the part of the co-insured.

"An insurer which accepts a premium based partially on the
inclusion of a co-insured under a policy of insurance has
assumed the risk of its negligence. We agree with the
reasoning of Mr. Justice Guittard, in his dissenting opinion
in the McBroome case, (515 S.W. 2d 32 Texas 1974): "The
insurer, which has accepted one premium covering the entire
property and has assumed the risk of the negligence of each
insured party, ought not to be allowed to shift the risk to
any one of them." [515 S. W. 2d, p. 44]
"We hold that the District Court properly entered summary
judgment on the ground that an insurance carrier may not
maintain a subrogation action against a party insured under
its policy. • • . "
One case that is often cited throughout the country for the princi;.
enunciated in Board of Education, is Home Insurance Co. v. Pinski srot~
Inc., 500 P. 2d 945 (Montana 1972).

In ·that case the insurers who had paiC

off an extensive amount on property damage loss brought an action against
an architect firm whom they alleged was the negligent party. The architec:
firm was insured through an indemnity firm which the court found was
really the same corporate entity as the plaintiff-insurer.

In holding

the'

the insurer in this case could not bring a subrogation action again~L ·•·.·
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architects, the court elaborated on some of the policy reasons for this
ger.eral rule:
"To permit the insurer to sue its own insured for a liability
covered by the insurance policy would violate these basic
equity principles, as well as violate sound public policy.
Such action, if permitted, would (1) allow the insurer to
expend premiums collected from its insured to secure a
judgment against the same insured on a risk insured against:
(2) give judicial sanciton to the breach of the insurance policy
by the insurer; (3) permit the insurer to secure information
from its insured under the guise of policy provisions available
for later use in the insurer's subrogation action against its own
insured; (4) allow the insurer to take advantage of its conduct
and conflict of interest with its insured; and (5) constitute
judicial approval of a breach of the insurer's relationship with
its own insured." 500 P.Zd at 949.
As in the Board of Education case, the court in Pinski Brothers affirmed

che summary judgment granted to the defendant at the trial court level.

For further elaboration on the generally recognized principle that
an insurer cannot bring an action against one of its co-insureds, see
Bucoda Trailer Park, Inc. v. State, 561 P.Zd 1100 (Wash. 1977); 16 Couch
on Insurance Zd, §61:133; and, 6AAppleman, Insurance Law and Practice,
§4055.

Although the Board of Education and the other cases cited above
invobed actions directly against the co-insured, it is of course a logical
and rational extension of the holding of those cases that an action against
an additional insurer of the co-insured would also be precluded. In United

~Fire Ins. Co. v. Beach, 2752o.2d473 (La.App. 1973), the Louisianna
::our• considered a case very similar to the facts of the Utah Board of

~~'~2-'-@_case. Some $54,000.00 had apparently been paid out by United
~tr': lns•1rance Company (USFIC) on a claim for fire loss on a policy
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from his own insured on the theory of indemnity any more
than that of subrogation, for the same considerations that
lead to denial of recovery on the one theory apply to the other.
Were it otherwise, the value of insurance against liability
for negligent acts would be greatly impaired . . . "90 N.W. 2d
at 142.
Plaintiff has taken the position that its action against defendant
arises either under a theory of subrogation or contribution. If plaintiff's
sa.~'

action arises under the theory of contribution, then it is based upon the

principles as an action for indemnity, i.e. reimbursement is sought agains:
one primarily liable for the loss.

Consequently, as was stated

in~.

the same considerations that lead to the denial of recovery against the coinsured in a subrogation action apply in an action under the theory of
contribution or indemnity.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF ISSUED A POLICY TO COVER THE PARTICULAR
RISK AND LOSS INVOLVED IN THIS CASE. DEFENDANT'S
P0Lx:¥ PROVIDED ONLY GENERAL OR BLANKET COVERAGE.
PLAINTIFF'S POLICY COVERING THE SPECIFIC RISK IS
PRIMARY AND DEFENDANT'S POLICY IS EXCESS .
Even if plaintiff was entitled to bring an action against defendant
as an insurer of the co-insured under plaintiff's policy, the trial court's
summary judgment in favor of defendant should still be affirmed because
of the specific vs. general policy rule adopted by the Utah Supreme court,
and recognized in plaintiff's brief.
The problem as identified by plaintiff's brief on this particular point
is a problem of the interpretation of two insurance policies both of which 1'
except for Exclusion l(e) of defendants policy, to cover the same risk.

,.
0

•

policies provide for pro-rata sharing of liability when there are two er "'
policies which cover the same loss on the same basis.

Plaintiff's ~olic<i

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

as follows:
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ft:

"If any of such other insurance does not provide for contribution
by equal shares, this company shall not be liable for a greater
proportion of such loss than the applicable limit of liability
under this policy for such loss bears to the total applicable
limit of liability of all valid and collectible insurance against
such loss."

Defendants policy reads as follows:
"This company shall not be liable for a greater proportion
of any loss than the amount hereby insured shall bear to
the whole insurance covering the property against the peril
involved, whether collectible or not."
Where both policies cover exactly the same risk on exactly the same
basis, it is, of course, consistent with basic notions of fairness that
each should be liable for a pro-rata share of the loss. This is, however,
not the case where the coverage does not apply on the same basis. Where one
insurer has undertaken to insure one particular risk and has issued its policy
to specifically cover that one particular risk, it should be held to be primary
and required to bear the entire loss.
Applied to the instant case, the insurance under plaintiff's policy
was obtained by Weber County Sheriff's Mounted Posse for the specific

Purpose of insuring against liability of the Posse and its officers, directors
and stockholders while acting within the scope of their duties as such and
upon the specific property mentioned in the policy plaintiff issued to
the Posse. On the other hand, the insurance obtained by Brent G. Story
from defendant is under a standard homeowner' s policy covering fire,
theft, natural disaster, and the general liability coverage for the insured
and '1 is family.
'
1

~;

''' 1 ~1 unlv
·,:

Lft

In other words, defendant's policy of insurance provides what

known as blanket or general insurance, and the policy of

2 r 0 ' 1 ldes

specific insurance .
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Plaintiff articulates very thoroughly in its brief that there is a
great deal of diversity in the cases regarding the proµer treatment of
insurance policies, both technically covering the same risk, but the one
providing blanket insurance and the other specific insurance.

Many

jurisdictions throughout the country refuse to recognize the distinction
of specific vs. general or blanket, and instead examine the "Other Insu:::.::
clauses of the policies and decide whether the language reveals an excess
and a primary insurer or whether the language simply provides for a proration of liability.
Plaintiff argues that it favors what it classifies as a minority
position, and that the Utah court should break loose of the precedents o:
the past and adopt the minority view. That view stated by plaintiff is t'.:a:
_where there is concurrent insurance coverage and the "Other Insurance"
clause of one liability policy conflicts with a similar clause of the other
liability policy, the clauses are mutually repugnant and the insurers shoe::
be required to share the loss in proportion to the limits of their respective
policies.
Apparently, plaintiff conglomerates a lot of other plans handed
down by the courts into what it calls the "majority rule". The important
point with regard to plaintiff's total discuss ion, is that the better reasor.e:
rule and the one apparently adopted by the Utah Supreme

Court is the cne

commonly known as the "Pennsylvania Rule", irrespective of where it
fits in to the majority vs. minority discuss ion.

Simply put, the Pennsyl'''

Rule would treat all specific insurance policies as primary insurance a~~
blanket insurance policies as excess or secondary insurance.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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==r.nsylvania courts have stated it, under such facts there is no longer
;ny "double insurance".
~2:

Under this treatment then, plaintiff would

oe entitled to come against defendant on the theory of subrogation

:s:ause where the primary insurance carrier rightfully undertakes its
J2ligation and pays all or part of the policy coverage, it has no right to
:e subrogated to the rights of the insured or an injured party and to
:ecover from a secondary insurer of the same insured and the same risk.
Xational Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group,
14 etah 2d 89, 377 P.2d 786 (1963).

Secondly, defendant being found an

2xces s insurer, would not be liable to the insured under its policy as
i'.

:-.as

no~

obligated itself to pay anything. The insured would have no

right against defendant-insurer and, therefore, it does not make sense to
s8eak of subrogation to any right of the insured against defendant.

Con-

'equently, under the Pennsylvania Rule, plaintiff in the instant case would
:1ave no right under a theory of subrogation since it is primarily liable having
co·vered the risk specifically, and under the theory of contribution defendant
"'.l:>uld still be immune from liability or res pons_ibility until plaintiff's policy
limit was exhausted.
The opinion in Blue Anchor Overall Co., Inc. v. Pennsylvania
L'.:'Tlberman's Mut. Ins. Co., 123 A. 2d 413 (Pa. 1956) explains the reasoning
one application of the Pennsylvania Rule, although it deals with two fire
<ns·Jrance policies.

In discussing the problem of apportioning the loss

"':'.".veen ::ie two insurers, the court said:
'F·-::-r example, suppose there is a loss on one item alone,
.vc- 1-::h is covered by both specific and blanket fire insurance

-11-
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policies. The question arises as to whether the full amount
of the blanket policy pro-rates with the specific policy to pay
the loss. Or suppose there is a fire loss on two items, and
the blanket policy covers both items while the s pee ific
policy covers only one. How is the loss to be apportioned
between the two policies? Although different courts have
applied various solutions to the above described problems,
in Pennsylvania the rule is clear that where there are specific
and blanket polices covering the damaged property, the specific
policy must pay in full, and if they are not sufficient to cover
the loss, the blanket policies pay the difference up to the amou~
of the policies."
As noted by plaintiff, the Utah Supreme Court has apparently
adopted the specific vs. general theory, without specifically calling it
the Pennsylvania Rule.

In Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v.

St. Paul Ins. Companies,

20 Utah 2d 95, 433 P.2d 602 (1967), the rule

was specifically adopted in a dispute as to whether the insurance company
of the title company or the blanket insurance coverage to Prudential Federal
Savings constituted the primary insurer. The facts of this case are quoted
directly from the court's opinion in plaintiffs brief, and it need only be
repeated that Prudential felt that its loan officer's embezzlement was the
cause of the loss of the first lien on property which they held a second
mortgage on, and therefore St. Paul, Prudential's insurer, was obligated
to pay for the loss under its policy provisions. On the other hand, St. Pac!
argued that the title insurance was the primary insurer because the failure
of Prudential to obtain a first lien came about as the result of the negllgenc
of the title company. As is noted by appellant, the court adopted the posi
of St. Paul and clearly applied it to the specific vs. general rule articulate:
as the Pennsylvania Rule in other jurisdictions:
"The rule having wide applicability provides that where a bl 3 ~'-

-12-
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policy contains a provision limiting its liability to an excess
over specific insurance, the blanket policy must res pond, only
if the specific fails to satisfy the loss." 433 P. 2d at 603.
The Utah Supreme Court has on at least two occasions adopted the
specific vs. general theory with respect to automobile liability policies.
The first of these cases is National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co.
v. Farmers Ins. Group, 14 Utah 2d 89, 377 P. 2d 786 (1963). In that
case, National Farmers was the liability insurer under an au to mobile
insurance policy with one Morgan.

Farmers Insurance Group was the

automobile liability insurer of one Thomas, a car salesman. Morgan
took his automobile to the automobile business where Thomas worked to
have it repaired. The repair required the car to be left there overnight
and Thomas, who worked there, offered his own automobile to Morgan
to take home. After Morgan arrived at his ha> me, for some unexplained
reason the car rolled out of the driveway and crashed into the building

,

of a Mr. Wolfe. Wolfe brought an action against Morgan to recover for
damages to his building.

Farmers Insurance Group, covering the owner

of the car, Thomas, denied coverage and refused to defend, and subsequently, National Farmers took on the defense of the action wherein it
Prevailed. Then, National Farmers brought a suit against Farmers Insurance
Group under the subrogation theory to recover the costs of the defense of
the action brought by Wolfe. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court
ruling that Farmers' policy with Thomas, the owner of the automobile in'

0

1
'

1'Ted, was primary insurance while the policy of National Farmers with
''Jan, ti1e

c>perator of the automobile involved, was secondary insurance.

-13-
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Because Farmers' policy was primary insurance, it had the obligation to
defend and therefore the expenses incurred by National Farmers were the
primary obligation of Farmers Group and therefore National Farmers was

e~

titled to be subrogated and to recover the costs and expenses of the lltiga!i:
The National Farmers case was cited as controlling authority
in a subsequent case, Christensen v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 21 Utah 2d
194, 443 P.2d 385 (1968). In that case, Western Casualty and Surety
Company was the automobile liability insurer of Christensen who was an
automobile repairman.

Farmers Insurance was the automobile liability

insurer one of Dr. Stevenson. Dr. Stevenson took his car to Christensen
to have it repaired, but the repair necessitated moving the car to another
garage. Enroute to the other garage, Christensen was involved in an
accident wherein a third party lost his life; As in the National Farmers
case, the Supreme Court found that the owner's policy was primary insurance
and the operator's policy was secondary insurance. The primary insurer
thereby had the first obligation to defend the action.
In Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 21 Utah 2d 358,
445 P.2d 772 (1968), the court dealt with a fact situation almost identical
to that in Chris tens en. The main opinion of Justice Henroid discusses only
the automobile business exclusion also discussed in the National Farme.l§.
and Christensen cases, but made no mention of the primary-secondary
question.

However, Chief Justice Ellett, in a concurring opinion, said

that the holding in National Farmers Union and Christensen required that
the court hold that the insurance issued to the owner of the car was primar
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insurance and that of the driver, secondary insurance.
The foregoing Utah cases provide strong support for defendants
position that the specific vs. general rule should be applied to the facts
ti:

of the instant case, and therefore plaintiff must assume primary liability
up to the face amount of its policy. Not only does the case law support
an adoption of the rule but it should be emphasized strongly that the
specific vs. general concept is the better reasoned rule among all of those
available, including the minority rule that is favored by plaintiff. Some of
the important policy reasons for adopting the specific vs. general concept
are elaborated by the Louisiana court which is the latest jurisdiction to
adopt the Pennsylvania Rule.

Fasullo v. American Druggist Ins. Co.,

262So. 2d 810 (La. App. 1972), dealt with some fire insurance policies,
the defendant's policy insuring only that portion of the building designated
nee

as the retail drug store and other personal property therein, and the other
policies covering the entire building including the personal property owned
by Fasullo and the J. P. Wholesale Drug Company. The court, after con-

sidering the arguments on both sides with regard to apportioning the damages,
Said:
"However, after a careful review of the various alternatives
about policy pro-ration, we are convinced that the proper
formula to be used is that which has commonly been designated
as the Pennsylvania Rule, which provides that in a case such
as the one now posed for our consideration the specific policy
must bear the entire loss on the portion of the premises which
it covers up to its face amount, with the blanket policy or
policies affording residual or excess coverage to the extent
of their respective limits of liability. "262 So. 2d at 815.
fhe Louisiana court in Fasullo, goes on in the course of its

'~inir:·n to mention several public policy reasons or advantages to the
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.....
adoption and administration of the Pennsylvania Rule as opposed to other
rules of pro-ration. The first and most important of those advantages ls
the simplicity and ease of ad ministration of the Pennsylvania Rule which w
in the opinion of the Louisiana court result in far less litigation than othe:
rules.

In subsequent cases, the principle is forever made clear that wher 2

one insurer has insured against one specific risk, it will be held to pay me:
of the full amount of the policy and resulting litigation of the kind involvec
in the instant case over questions of pro-ration among two or even three
or four insurers would be eliminated. A second advantage mentioned by the
Louisiana court is that the Pennsylvania Rule tends to grant more coverage
to the insured in a multi-carrier situation. This is particularly true with
fire insurance policies where different policies cover different pieces of pr:
belonging to the same insured.
It is important to note when one talks about important policy rea'

for the adoption of the Pennsylvania Rule, that all of the advantages listec
on page 12

and 13 in plaintiff's brief for the adoption of the minority rule

are equally attainable by the "Pennsylvania Rule". The important differenc;
is that the Utah court has specifically chosen to ado pt the "specific vs.
general" concept, and as noted by plaintiff the court has categorically rejected the minority position in the case of Russell v. Paulson, 18 Utah 2"•·.
417 P.2d 658 (1966). Also contrary to plaintiff's statement, the rule is th 2
most practical and logical of the two rules to apply, while still maintain!:.:
the concept that one insurer is primarily liable for the loss.

Under the

minority pro-rata rule it very often is the case that all of the insurers
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·C

quired to pro-rate sit off in the wings and wait for the other companies to
:nave forward and make the first payment.

The Pennsylvania rule identifies

'he primary insurer and there is no aues tion then which company has the
'O

du~y

move forward.
Plaintiff takes the position in its brief that even if the "majority

rule", (whatever that may actually be) , is a pp lied to the instant case de-

fendant would still be liable because of defendants pro-rata provision in
its policy.

Plaintiff claims essentially that in order for the specific vs.

general rule to apply, the policy must state that it will provide excess insurance only should there be concurrent coverage by a specific policy. The
argument goes on that since there is nothing of that nature in Western' s
policy, the insurance should be presumed to be primary.
Fasullo v. American Druggist Ins. Co., supra,

However, in

all of the policies in that case,

whether they were ultimately deter mined to be specific or general, contained the same pro-rata clause that is contained in defendants policy.
The clause reads:
"This company shall not be liable for a greater proportion
of any loss than the amount hereby insured shall bear to
the whole insurance covering the property against the peril
involved, whether collectible or not.
Simply put, the Louisiana court did not require that the insurance company
Which they found to be an excess insurer because of its blanket or general
00

licy, specifically mention in its insurance policy that it will be excess

::r.l;•

11

there is other insurance covering a s pee ific risk.

The true purpose

'e Jr•,-rr1ta clause and why it did not automatically provide for an action

-" ibution

'Jr

subrogation is covered in the courts opinion:

-17-
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"Moreover, the statutory pro-rata clause merely states that the
company shall not be liable for a greater percentage of a loss
than the proportion which its face value bears to the total amoi;r:
of insurance coverage on the property damaged. This clause
merely establishes a negative limitation of liability and does
not set forth an affirmative right to obtain contribution from
other companies having coverage on the damaged property."
262 So. 2d at 814.
It is defendant's position the court was correct in its reasoning that the ins·

need not indicate that it be excess over other specific insurance, becausec'
that obvious result where the specific vs. general rule has been adopted,
that the pro-rata clause contained in respondent's policy does not set

ar.

fort~

an affirmative right to obtain contribution from other companies having cove·
The specific vs. general concept, cometimes known as the Penn·
sylvania Rule, has been adopted by the Utah Supreme Court and should aga:
be applied by the court to the facts of the instant case for all of the reason:
referred to above .
POINT III.
COVERAGE OF THE PARTICULAR RISK INVOLVED IN THIS
CASE IS EXCLUDED BY SPECIFIC EXCLUSION l (e) OF
RESPONDENT'S POLICY.
Plaintiff

contends in its statement of facts that coverage under

either insurance policy is not in dispute.

However, in defendants memo·

randum in support of its motion for summary judgment, in Western's policy,
exclusion l (e) was specifically relied on as· a bas is for granting the summa:
judgment. It is defendant's position that this particular exclusion was me:
apply to this very type of fact situation. The specific language of the ex·
clusion is as follows:
"This policy does not apply:
-18-
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"e. To bodily injury or property damage arising out of any
pre mises, other than an insured premises, owned, rented
or controlled by any insured. . . "
The injury involved in the instant case was the result or occurred
because of a condition of the property involved -- an open gate.

It is

undisputed that the drill grounds property where the accident occurred
ls not an insured premises under Story's homeowners policy with Western.
Defendant takes the position that the exclusion is applicable and operates
to remove defendant from any liability for the damages incurred by Haggen.
If there is any dispute as to the applicability of this particular
exclusion, it would originate in the meaning of the phrase "arising out
of any premises". There is apparently very little case law throughout
the country defining or applying this term as it relates to uninsured premises
owned or controlled by the insured. The cases which have most often
construed the phrase "arising out of" involve a auestion of coverage for
injuries arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation, use etc.
of any motor vehicle owned or operated or rented by the insured. Generally,
these cases indicate that the term "arising out of" simply requires that there
be some causal connection between the ownership, maintenance, operation,
etc. of the automobile and the injury.
lnMcDonaldv. GreatAmericanins. Co., 224F. Supp. 369,
ID.c. R.I.). the insured brought a declaratory judgment action to determine
Whether the insurers were required to conduct the defense of actions brought
aqair"t
,
d by persons claiming injuries as a result af the insure d
- - th e insure
· ·y rh:own a cherry bomb from an automobile.

The court held that a specific
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exclusion in Great American Insurance Company's policy, preventing coverac;
for injuries arising out of the use of automobiles away from the insured Premises, was applicable and therefore the company had no defense obligation.
The court in McDonald gave some guidance on the definition oft',
term "arising out of":
"In most jurisdictions it is held that for an injury to arise out
of the use of an automobile within the meaning of an insurance
policy, it is not necessary that the injury be produced by the
force of the insured vehicle itself. It is sufficient tha the use
of the automobile be 'connected with the accident or the creation
of the condition that caused the accident'.
(Omit citations)"
224 F. Supp. at 372.
In Carter v. Bergeron, 160 A. 2d 348 (N .H. 1960), the court
construed the term "arising out of" to mean:
"It is sufficient that the use was 'connected with the accident
or the creation of a condition that caused the accident . . . '"
160 A. 2d at 354.
It is generally recognized that whatever causal connection is

required between the condition of the premises and the accident or the
injuries, it need not amount to proximate legal cause. See Manufacturers
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Goodville Mut. Casualty Co., 170 A.2d 571 (Pa.1961)
Brenner v. Aetna Ins. Co. , 445 P. 2d 4 7 4 (Ariz. 19 68); 12 Couch on Insurance
2d, §45:56.
A case that is much more factually helpful than the automobile
cases referred to above is Jackson v. Lajuanie, 253 So. 2d 540 (La. App.
1971). The exclusion in that case was almost identical to the language
in res pendent' s policy in the instant case. The exclusion read:
"To any act or omission in connection with premises, other
than as defined, which are owned, rented or controlled by
an insured. . . • "
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As discussed above, the term "arising out of" and the term
"connected with", are treated by many of the cases as being synonymous.
In Jackson where the injury involved an accidental shooting, the issue

was whether the shooting was "an act or omission in connection with
premises". Apparently the insured, while working at a service station,
pointed a gun at the plaintiff which he thought was loaded with blanks,
The gun discharged and injured the plaintiff.
The insurer, Continental Insurance Company, relied upon the
exclusion auoted above for avoiding liability, and the Louisianna court
upheld Continental' s position. The court explains that the basic intention
of a comprehensive liability policy like the homeowner' s policy which was
involved is to cover the insured for all sums which he may become legally
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage.
But, the policies contain several exclusions which the court says are of
two different kinds. The one type of exclusion is concerned with activities
of the insured as they relate directly to other persons. The court explains
that such exclusions involve the person to person activities which would
include intentional torts and business pursuits. The other type of exclusion
is concerned with premises of the insured as the condition of such premises
might relate to other persons. That type of exclusion is exactly the type
that Exclusion 1 (e) of Western' s policy fits under. The court in Jackson went
on to explain that such exclusionary clauses and the clause involved in that
case particularly:
"Restrict coverage where liability is incurred because of the
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condition of the premises owned, rented or controlled by the
insured, other than those defined, where the condition is
attributable to the act or omission of the insured." 253 S.2d
at 545.
The Jackson case is very strong support for Westerns position
that the bodily injury in the instant case arose out of premises other than
an insured premises, owned, rented or controlled by the insured. Because
the instant facts involve a gate being left open on the premises, it ls proba8i
an easier case to find a causal connection between the premises and the
injury than is true with Jackson where a gun accidentally discharged at the
uninsured premises.
Again, all that seems to be required by Jackson and the other cltec
cases for the exclusion to apply is some causal connection between the
condition of the uninsured premises and the injury or damages involved and
ownership or control by the insured.

In light of this, an argument that it was

the negHgrnce of Story and not the condition of the premises that caused the
accident is an argument that cannot stand.
The meaning of the exclusion in the instant case could be more
accurately and clearly stated thus: To bodily injury or property damage
arising out of the rental, ownership or control by any insured of any premise:
other than the insured premises. That is, if the injury arose out of the pre~:i
it must have arisen because of some negligent act or omission on the part 0'

someone in control of or responsible for the property.

In this case, it

was an o~n gate that was the cause of the injury. Exel us ion

1 (e)

ctearlY

applies in this case and Western is not liable either under its personal

-22-
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liability coverage or the medical payments coverage.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed because:
1. Brent G. Story was a co-insured under the policy issued by
91aintiff and therefore plaintiff is not entitled to recover any amount from
defendant because an insurer may not bring an action and recover against
lts own co-insured or the co-insured' s additional insurer, under either a
theory of subrogation or contribution.
2.

Furthermore, even if plaintiff was allowed to bring an action

against its co-insured and thereby an action against the co-insured' s
additional insurance company, defendant is not liable in this case because
of the specific vs. general theory or the "Pennsylvania Rule" which has
been°adopted in Utah and which is the better reasoned rule to apply.

Because

plaintiff has is sued a policy to specifically cover the particular risk and loss

,

involved in the instant case, and defendant's policy provided only general
or blanket coverage, plaintiff's coverage is primary and defendant ·s coverage
is excess and plaintiff must bear the entire loss up to the face amount
of its policy.
3.

Finally, contrary to plaintiff's contention, there is a dispute

as to whether coverage is provided for the particular risk involved in this
case by defendants policy.

It is defendant's position that the coverage is

excluded bys pecific Exclusion 1 (e) of its policy which states the policy
does not "PPly to bodily injury or property damage arising out of any premises,
1
'

;;n insured

premises, owned, rented or controlled by any insured.

-23-
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The term "arising out of" means a "causal connection with", and the better
reasoned cases would find that Story s negligence in leaving the gate open
at the drill grounds or uninsured premises, resulted in injury arising out
of the uninsured premises.
Respectfully submitted this

30th

day of September

, 1977.
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